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(The following is the original version of a review later published in modified form in the 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22 (2009), pp. 245-246) 
 
Jeff McMahan’s main contention in this book is that common sense beliefs about the 
morality of killing in war are deeply mistaken. In particular, he argues against the so-
called ‘moral equality of combatants’, the claim that the combatants on the just side in a 
war and those on the unjust side have the same moral status and an equal liberty-right to 
kill each other. His most serious argument against the equality thesis is that the idea that 
one makes oneself liable to defensive attack merely by posing a threat to another has no 
intuitive plausibility at all outside the context of war. After all, police officers engaged in 
a gunfight with mobsters pose a threat to the mobsters, but that does not give the 
mobsters the liberty-right to kill the policeman – instead they are supposed to surrender. 
McMahan then discusses several important arguments intended to show that it is 
permissible to fight in an unjust war provided that one abides by the ius in bello 
constraints; and he tries to show that all these arguments are mistaken. The first such 
argument is that in most wars ‘just’ soldiers are also liable to attack because they pose a 
threat not only to the unjust soldiers on the other side, but also to innocent bystanders. If 
this argument holds up, it would significantly lessen the practical relevance of 
McMahan’s main contention. He tries to counter this objection by  claiming that 
justification (which just soldiers have) defeats liability, and that this is a familiar principle 
in law. However, his interpretation of the law does not comprise more than half a page 
and is somewhat dubious. Contrary to what he suggests, justification does not always 
defeat tort liability outside of the context of strict liability. It is also worth mentioning 
that most philosophers who have thought about the question whether the necessity 
defence for inflicting damages on a third party defeats liability are of the opinion that it 
does not. 
He also discusses, among other things, the arguments that just combatants somehow  
voluntarily waive their right not to be killed by unjust combatants, that the epistemic 
situation of unjust combatants is such that they can have at least subjective justification 
for participation in an unjust war, that there is a duty to defer to the epistemic authority of 
the government, and that the alleged duty to support the efficient functioning of just 
institutions somehow justifies the participation in an unjust war. He presents these 
arguments in a clear form and tries to make them as strong as possible before dissecting 
and refuting them very convincingly. In a following chapter he does the same with 
several arguments claiming that unjust combatants are for the most part fully excused for 
their participation in an unjust war. In his view, most unjust combatants are only partially 
excused. 
In the fourth chapter McMahan further clarifies the concept of liability to attack which 
is so important for his philosophy. He usefully distinguishes between different kinds of 
threats posed by persons, such as culpable threats, partially excused threats, excused 
threats, etc., and tries to determine the moral status of each of these kinds of threatening 
persons and how they fare with regard to liability to defensive attack. McMahan is well 
aware that some of the things he is saying here are counter-intuitive (for example, he 
thinks that innocent threats are not liable to defensive attack) but he is undeterred by this 
and tries to provide arguments for why we should jettison those intuitions. However, 
these arguments are not always convincing and might have further rather counter-
intuitive implications. 
In the last chapter McMahan confronts the fact that on his account of liability to 
military attack civilians can, in principle, be liable to military attack. Yet he argues that 
the circumstances where civilians will thus be liable will hardly ever arise in practice. 
However, his argument relies, among other things, on the doctrine of double effect, 
whose correctness McMahan simply assumes without argument. It also relies on the 
assumption that civilians can only be liable to attack if attacking them is in all likelihood 
a reasonably effective means to achieve a just goal. But whether this really is so depends, 
contrary to McMahan, heavily on context. Thus, McMahan’s philosophy might be much 
better suited to justify ‘terrorism’ than he is prepared to admit. 
McMahan’s book is a great achievement. It is absolutely lucid and is the most 
comprehensive and sophisticated criticism to date of the ‘moral equality of combatants’ 
and of the idea that civilians and soldiers can delegate their moral responsibility for the 
waging of an unjust war to the government. For anyone interested in just war theory – 
and for soldiers and citizens who take their responsibility seriously – this book is a must-
read.  
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